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The Johnson Administration-Judicial
Appointments-1963-1966*
Harold W. Chaset
I. THE KENNEDY SELECTIONS
When Lyndon B. Johnson became President seven appoint-
ments to the federal bench made by President Kennedy were
still awaiting confirmation.' Since only one of these appointees,
Homer Thornberry, had been confirmed by the Senate prior to
the assassination, Johnson could have withdrawn the names of
the other six and, presumably, could have even refused to for-
mally appoint Thornberry. However, with understandable and
admirable loyalty to the late President, President Johnson pro-
ceeded with the formalities required to effectuate the Kennedy
nominations. Unfortunately for him, two of the seven nominees
turned out to be highly controversial.
A. DAvm RABiNoviTz
After President Kennedy had nominated David Rabinovitz
of Sheboygan to the federal district bench in Wisconsin, he let
it be known that he was for Rabinovitz "all the way."2 However,
neither of Wisconsin's Democratic senators favored the appoint-
ment.3 In addition, the ABA's Standing Committee on Federal
Judiciary was vehemently opposed to the appointment and rated
Rabinovitz as unqualified for the post. Rabinovitz had been
legal counselor for the United Auto Workers in its titanic strug-
gle with the Kohler Company of Wisconsin, and his candidacy
* This Article is another interim report on an extensive study of
the appointment of federal judges being done under the auspices of
The Brookings Institution. See Chase, Federal Judges: The Appointing
Process, 51 MmN. L. REV. 185 (1966). Many of the insights into the ap-
pointive process have been derived from personal interviews with offi-
cials who preferred not to be quoted. Their confidence is respected, and
their assistance is greatly appreciated.
t- Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
1. David Rabinovitz (Dist. of Wisconsin); George C. Edwards, Jr.
(Sixth Circuit); Charles H. Tenney (S. Dist. of New York); Homer
Thornberry (W. Dist. of Texas); A. Leon Higginbotham (E. Dist. of
Pennsylvania); Spottswood Robinson (Dist. of District of Columbia);
and John M. Davis (E. Dist. of Pennsylvania).
2. H. CHASE & A. LERmAN, KENNEDY Am =mE PREss 521 (1965).
3. See Landauer, Judgeships and Politics, Wall Street Journal,
July 11, 1966, at 18, col. 4; Editorial, St. Paul Dispatch, May 5, 1965, at
36, col. 1; Minneapolis Tribune, May 1, 1965, at 15, col. 5; N.Y. Times,
March 21, 1965, at 52, col. 3.
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had been strongly urged by Walter Reuther.4 This led to charges
from some quarters that the ABA Committee opposed the nomi-
nation because Rabinovitz was a "labor lawyer." The ABA Com-
mittee resented these charges and took the highly unusual step
of refuting them in its 1964 midyear report.5
In view of the opposition of the Wisconsin senators and the
ABA Committee, the Senate Judiciary Committee made no move
to further confirmation of Rabinovitz in 1963. However, on
January 7, 1964, after Congress had recessed, President Johnson
dutifully made Rabinovitz a recess appointment. The Wisconsin
senators now felt freer to staunchly oppose the nomination, since
they could reasonably presume that Johnson did not have the
same commitment to it that President Kennedy had felt. As a
result, Congress adjourned again, on October 4, 1964, without
4. Editorial, St. Paul Dispatch, May 5, 1965, at 36, col. 1.
5. Since certain statements were made in the press concerning
our report to the Senate Judiciary Committee on one individual,
it seems advisable to your Committee once again to acquaint the
Association with certain of its procedures. It is a fact that the
Committee gave no reasons in its original report to the Judiciary
Committee for its finding that the individual in question was
"not qualified." No inference should be drawn from this.
Suggestions have again been made by some who disagreed
with this Committee that our position was affected, consciously
or not, by the fact that a prospective nominee belonged to a
particular political party and had been active in its political
activities, or by the fact that he had been a counsel for labor
unions.
We are confident that such accusations are not warranted.
* . . Well over ninety per cent of the persons whom this Com-
mittee has found, formally or informally, to be "qualified," or
better for judicial office during the past three years have be-
longed to the same political party as the individual in question,
and while this Committee has sought to promote bi-partisan, or
nonpartisan, selection of judges, it has never, in considering the
qualifications of a specified nominee, considered his political
designation as bearing upon that question. There is no excep-
tion to this.
The number of individuals considered during this period
who have been active on behalf of Labor unions is necessarily
smaller but, here, too, your Committee has, we think, demon-
strated that such an affiliation is not regarded by it as in any
way disqualifying or even as a matter to be considered in con-
nection with its findings with regard to a prospective nominee.
For example, at substantially the same time when your Com-
mittee reported the individual in question to be "not qualified"
another person who had been identified with the representation
of labor unions for many years during his practice, and had
been a union organizer before he became a lawyer, was found
by a majority of your Committee to be "qualified." There have
been many instances during the past several years where per-
sons who have represented labor unions, or unpopular causes, or
minority groups, have been found to be "qualified" or better.
89 A.B.A. REP. 188 (1964).
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confirming the appointment. The outcome of the contest over
the appointment of Rabinovitz might have been very different
had President Kennedy lived. Following this adjournment of
Congress, President Johnson allowed the vacancy to go unfilled,
giving rise to pressure which Kennedy might have exploited to
have his own way. Ultimately Johnson succumbed to this pres-
sure, and in May of 1965 he appointed James E. Doyle to the
judgeship that Kennedy had hoped would go to Rabinovitz.7
B. GEORGE C. EDwARDs, JR.
When George C. Edwards, Jr. was nominated by President
Kennedy in September of 1963 to be a United States Court of Ap-
peals Judge for the Sixth Circuit, he seemed to have a number of
things going for him. He was labeled "qualified" by the ABA
Committee and had the approval of the two Democratic senators
from his states (Michigan) plus a warm endorsement from the
Republican governor, George Romney." In addition, he had held
a series of posts which on their face would seem to have afforded
him with experience eminently suiting him for a federal judicial
post. He had been (a) president of the Detroit City Council,
1946-1950, (b) probate judge in Detroit, Michigan, 1951-1954,
(c) judge of Wayne County Circuit Court, 1954-1956, (d) jus-
tice of the Michigan Supreme Court, 1956-1962, and (e) police
commissioner for the City of Detroit, 1962-1963.10 Despite these
impressive credentials, Judge Edwards was subjected to more
than perfunctory questioning when he appeared before a sub-
committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee as part of the con-
firmation proceedings. Questions propounded to Judge Edwards
by Senators Ervin (D.-N.C.), Dirkson (R.-Ill.), and Hruska
6. After several months the Milwaukee Sentinel editorialized:
"The vacancy has gone beyond the point of public tolerance. Because
of the continued inability or unwillingness of the Johnson Administra-
tion to appoint a judge, the very system of justice in that court is
breaking down." David Carley, the Wisconsin Democratic National
Committeeman, complained: "When I go around the state I get blis-
tered for not bringing this thing to a head. Things are not only de-
teriorating from the judicial standpoint but the position of the Demo-
cratic party is deteriorating and put in jeopardy by the continued de-
lay." N.Y. Times, March 21, 1965, at 52, col. 3.
7. For an excellent, detailed account of the politics of recent ap-
pointments to federal judgeships in Wisconsin, see Landauer, Judge-
ships and Politics, Wall Street Journal, July 11, 1966, at 18, col. 4.
8. Hearings on the Nomination of George Clifton Edwards, Jr. to
be United States Circuit Judge, Sixth Circuit, Before A Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963).
9. Id. at 47-48.
10. Id. at 9.
19681
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
(R.-Neb.) manifested concern (1) that Edwards' father had been
a Socialist," (2) that Edwards had been a member of the Ameri-
can Student Union,12 (3) that Edwards had been a labor organi-
zer,13 (4) that he had been "sentenced to thirty days in prison for
a contempt arising out of an alleged violation of an injunction
issued in connection with a strike,"' 4 (5) that he had written
"a decision of the Michigan Supreme Court which upset a prec-
edent of eighteen years, and favored the union for which [he]
had worked as a paid organizer,"'I5 and (6) that he was a Deputy
Judge of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor
Organization.'8
Representatives of the Tennessee Bar Association 17 appeared
at the hearings to protest the Edwards nomination, but added
little to the concerns already expressed by the Senators. Mr. S.
Shephard Tate, the president of that association, stated that it is
"the position of the Tennessee Bar Association that the admissions
by Commissioner Edwards before this subcommittee of certain
past activities would show a disqualification for this high judicial
office and would create in the public mind and in the bar a lack
of confidence in the courts of the United States."' 8  Judge Ed-
wards handled himself and the concerns about him very well-
patently well enough to allay fears that he lacked judicial tem-
perament-and his nomination was confirmed. But Mr. Tate had
revealed that there had been some reservations about the appoint-
ment on the ABA Committee. 9 At best, Judge Edwards had
been granted a "qualified" rating begrudgingly and, however
well he had handled himself in the hearings, the now well-pub-
licized fact that he had been a militant unionist would leave
lingering doubts in many quarters about Edwards' judicial tem-
perament.
11. Id. at 13-14.
12. Id. at 14.
13. Id. at 15.
14. Id. at 15-18.
15. Id. at 18.
16. Id. at 19.
17. The state of Tennessee is in the Sixth Circuit.
18. Hearings, supra note 8, at 44.
19. . . . as I understand it... from tae chairman of the Amer-
ican Bar Association Standing Committee on the Federal Judi-
ciary, Mr. Robert W. Meserve, from Boston, as I recall-I recall
that he wrote to me, and I understood that he wrote to this
subcomnmittee to say that it was one of the relatively rare in-
stances in which the committee was not unanimous, but the
majority had stated that the nominee was qualified ....
Id. at 45.
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II. JOHNSON'S 1964 NOMINATIONS
In 1964, the Johnson Administration made eighteen nomina-
tions which were in no way legacies of the late President Ken-
nedy. A list of the 1964 nominees and some relevant data about
each of them follows on the next two pages.
The Johnson appointments of 1964 had several interesting
characteristics. All but one of the appointees, an elevation from
a district to a circuit court, were Democrats; they tended to be
a little younger than Eisenhower and Kennedy appointees; a
relatively high percentage (33%) had attended Ivy League law
schools; a relatively high percentage (25%) of the district judges
had been United States Attorneys at the time of their nomina-
tion; and two of the three special court nominees had come up
through the ranks as employees of their special courts. But thun-
der clouds were forming on the horizon.
By ABA Committee standards, the Johnson Administration
had not distinguished itself by its judicial appointments in that
first full year. In comparison with the Eisenhower and Kennedy
Administrations, the Johnson Administration was low in its per-
centage of "exceptionally well" and "well qualifieds," and very
high in "unqualifieds:"
Johnson
Eisenhower Kennedy (first year)
Exceptionally well
Qualified 17.1% 16.6% 5.6%
Well Qualified 44.6 45.6 22.2
Qualified 32.6 31.5 55.5
Not Qualified 5.7 6.3 16.7
The ABA Committee was not pleased. In its 1964 report,
it lamented:
Last year's annual report started off with the statement
that, during the period covered by it, there had been no nomi-
nation for lifetime judicial office submitted to the United States
Senate of any person who had been previously reported by this
Committee to the Attorney General as "not -qualified." We are
told that "pride goeth before a fall." Any feeling of satisfaction
which your Committee may have then had in the practical
agreement between its conclusions and those of the appointing
authority has surely been lessened by the nominations sub-
mitted since last July.2 0
20. 89 A.B.A. REP. 483 (1964).
19681
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III. JOHNSON'S 1965 NOMINATIONS
The thirty-two 1965 Johnson nominations on the whole fared
markedly better than the earlier ores in the ABA Committee
ratings, but they were still not on a par with the Eisenhower and
Kennedy appointments.
ABA Ratings of Johnson 1965 Appointments
Exceptionially Well Qualified 9.4%
Well Qualified 40.6
Qualified 43.7
Not Qualified 6.3
A list of Johnson's 1965 nominees with relevant data on each
follows on the next several pages.
Ten of the twenty-three nominated to the district and special
courts were men who had served on their respective state
benches and four of the nine nominees for Court of Appeals posts
were elevations from district benches. The ABA Committee was
generally pleased with these choices and gave them generally
high ratings.
Ratings of State Judges Nominated to District and Special
Courts
Exceptionally Well Qualified 2
Well Qualified 4
Qualified 2
Not Qualified 1 (Morrissey)
No Rating Requested 1
Ratings of Judges Elevated from District Courts
Well Qualified 2
Qualified 1
No Rating Requested 1
Only two of: the nominees were United States Attorneys at the
time of appointment, although. ten had at one time or another
served in the Department of Justice.
Normally, such a record in the ALA ratings would have been
enough to merit praise in the nation's press and would have
given the administration a good public image with respect to
judicial appointments. But the biggest news events concerning
judicial appointments in 1965 were the highly controversial nom-
inations of James P. Coleman and Francis X. Morrissey. Whether
it deserved it or not, the Johnson Administration's reputation
came out of the fights over those nominations considerably tar-
nished.
[Vol. 52:965
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A. JNxs P. COLEMAN
When President Johnson nominated Coleman, a former Mis-
sissippi governor (1956-1960) for a post on the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in June of 1965, it was a foregone conclusion
that the nomination would create a furor among liberals and in
the civil rights movement. Mrs. Victoria Gray of Hattiesburg,
one of the leaders of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party,
raged at a news conference: "Throughout Mr. Coleman's long
career, he has held virtually every type of office in the State of
Mississippi, all of which have been won only over the rights-
and often the bodies-of Negro citizens of that state."23 Repre-
sentative Don Edwards (D.-Cal.), chairman of Americans for
Democratic Action, issued a statement:
It is ironic that at the very point that the American Gov-
ernment and people have taken steps to eradicate segregation
from this country, the American President should appoint to
the court a man committed to frustrating the will of the people
and the human rights guaranteed to every man, regardless of
race.
24
It was true that Coleman was a strong segregationist with a
legalistic rather than an emotional approach to separation of
the races. He had, as governor, pushed a number of laws in-
tended to rigidly maintain racial segregation in schools and in
public accomodations through the Mississippi legislature.25 How-
ever, Coleman also led an unsuccessful fight to adopt a new state
constitution which did not mention race, supported John F.
Kennedy for President in 1960, prevented the White Citizens
Councils from receiving tax money, called in the FBI to investi-
gate a lynching in southern Mississippi, and supported former
Representative Brooks Hays of Little Rock when he was un-
seated by a segregationist. He was branded a "Kennedy liberal"
by Ross Barnett during his successful gubernatorial campaign in
1961 and was unable to shake that label during his own unsuc-
cessful gubernatorial campaign in 1963.2 6
In a strategy conceived to counter or at least to put the bar-
rage of criticism in perspective, the Attorney General of the
United States took the highly unusual step of testifying in behalf
of Coleman at the beginning of Senate Committee hearings on the
23. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1965, at 14, col. 4.
24. Id.
25. Id. Senator Wayne Morse (D.-Ore.) inserted a full dossier
on Coleman's segregationist positions into the Congressional Record.
111 CONG. REc. 18,235-41 (1965).
26. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1965, at 14, col. 5, 6.
1968]
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nomination.27  Attorney General Katzenbach made no effort to
deny that Governor Coleman had supported racial segregation.
The burden of his testimony was that Coleman's statements in
support of segregation
cannot be considered in a vacuum. They must be considered
in the context of the society and the times in which they
were made. In the second place, there is a full record of other
actions taken and other pronouncements made by the same
individual.
These other activities give perspective to the picture and
alter the surface impression. When the full picture is consid-
ered, we see not the caricature of an unyielding white suprema-
cist but a man who was frequently willing to take great politi-
cal risks to support moderation and respect for law and or-
der when the opposite course would have been the politically
expedient one.28
The Attorney General's appearance and able advocacy did
not allay the stronger critics of the nomination. Among others,
Rep. John Conyers (D.-Mich.), Rep. William F. Ryan (D.-N.Y.),
Professor Thomas R. Emerson (Yale Law School), Professor
Louis Lusky (Columbia Law School), and representatives of lead-
ing civil rights organizations appeared before the Committee to
vigorously protest the nomination.2 As they read Coleman's rec-
ord, the best that could be said for him was that he had been
subtle in support of segregation rather than extreme.30 Through-
out the hearings, Senator Javits (R.-N.Y.) and Hart (D.-Mich.),
both members of the Judiciary Committee, also demonstrated
27. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1965, at 1, col. 4. This was believed to
be the first time in this century that an Attorney General had given
public testimony to a congressional committee on behalf of a federaljudicial appointee. In 1929, however, Attorney General William D.
Mitchell had spoken during an executive session in support of the ap-
pointment by President Hoover of Albert L. Watson to a district judge-
ship in Pennsylvania. In addition, Attorney General Herbert Brownell,
Jr. sent a statement which was read to the committee by an assistant
in support of President Eisenhower's appointment of Simon E. Sobeloff
to the Court of Appeals in the Fourth Circuit. Id.
28. Hearings on the Nomination of James P. Coleman of Missis-
sippi, To Be U. S. Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit Before a Special
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
4 (1965).
29. Id. at 17-119.
30. For example, Professor Emerson stated:
No one would suggest the appointment of a person who ad-
vocated the use of force and violence in race relations. That is
not the problem. The problem is to appoint persons who will
seek to evade, delay, obstruct in various ways enforcement of
Federal laws as declared by Congress and the Supreme Court.
That is exactly the approach to segregation which Governor
Coleman's record indicates he has followed in the past.
Id. at 48.
[Vol. 52:965
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their reservations about the nomination by the questions they
asked.
It was Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D.-Mass.) who finally
put the crucial question to Mr. Coleman. After informing the
Committee that President Kennedy had asked Coleman to be
Secretary of the Army in 1961 and after suggesting that the re-
sponsibilities of a federal judge are quite different because of
civil rights questions, Senator Kennedy asked, "Do you hold any
personal beliefs or have any doubts that seriously question this
national policy [as indicated in the Brown decision and the Civil
Rights Acts] ?"31
Mr. Coleman answered:
No, sir, I do not have. I think that the people of Missis-
sippi know that if I go on the Court of Appeals that I am going
to do my duty one hundred percent pursuant to the decisions of
the Supreme Court which are binding on me and of otherjudges as well as acts of Congress which has [sic] been sus-
tained by the Supreme Court of the United States. I will have
no difficulty whatever in doing that. I wouldn't allow my name
to be considered for a judgeship, Senator Kennedy, if I did
have any difficulty. 32
Evidently, an overwhelming majority of the Judiciary Committee
and of the Senate itself did not feel that the case against Coleman
was so clear or so impressive as to compel rejection of his nomi-
nation. The Committee voted its approval 13 to 2 and the Sen-
ate followed suit 76 to 8.33
Liberal elements in the political spectrum were still op-
posed to the nomination as evidenced by the names of the
Senators who voted against confirmation: Case (R.-N.J.), Cooper
(R.-Ky.), Douglas (D.-Ill.), Hart (D.-Mich.), Javits (R.-N.Y.),
Morse (D.-Ore.), Nelson (D.-Wis.), and Proxmire (D.-Wis.).
Three others were paired against the nomination: Hartke (D.-
Ind.), Mondale (D.-Minn.), and Neuberger (D.-Ore.).34 Signifi-
cantly, this roster does not include some names that one would
expect to find on a list of Senate liberals. Some, like Clark (D.-
Pa.), McNamara (D.-Mich.), and Tydings (D.-Md.), felt com-
pelled to explain their lack of opposition. Senator Robert Ken-
nedy (D.-N.Y.) went on record saying, "We have not often
agreed, but Governor Coleman is a man of his word and in my
judgment a man of high character."35
31. Id. at 128.
32. Id. at 128-29.
33. N.Y. Times, July 27, 1965, at 16, col 7.
34. Id.
35. 111 CONG. IEc. 18,243 (1965).
19681
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Clearly, administration efforts notwithstanding, there were
still significant and articulate elements even in the Senate who
regarded the nomination as, to say the least, a poor one.30 The
attention given in the press to accounts of criticism of the nomi-
nation as well as the coverage of the hearings tended to create
an impression that something was amiss in judicial selection.37
It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the administration
did not come through this contest unscathed.
B. FRANcIS X. MoRRIssEY
In late September of 1965, President Johnson announced
the nomination of Francis X. Morrissey to the District Court of
Massachusetts. Official Washington, and indeed aficionados of
American politics everywhere, were titillated by the riddle: why
did President Johnson nominate a Kennedy-sponsored candidate
whom the Kennedys manifestly never dared to nominate when
one of them was President and another was Attorney General?3 8
Morrissey himself shed some light on the matter by telling
friends that shortly before the assassination President Kennedy
had promised him the nomination after the 1964 election.3
Undoubtedly, the Johnson administration would not have se-
lected Morrissey for a judgeship on his own initiative.39a But
when Senator Edward M. Kennedy continually pressed for Mor-
rissey's nomination, President Johnson was induced to go along
with what he perceived to be the late President's wishes in the
matter as he had done on his earliest judicial appointments. The
nomination was also consistent with hds predilection for acceding
to senators' wishes in regard to appointments whenever possible.
Little credence was given by most knowledgeable commentators
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 30, 1965, at 17, col. 1; id., July 3,
1965, at 6, col. 1.
38. Washington Post, Oct. 1, 1965, at A., 11, col. 1.
39. Id.
39a. A Los Angeles Times story stated:
President Johnson informed Democratic congressional lead-
ers Wednesday that he will stand behind the controversial nom-
ination of Francis X. Morrissey ....
Mr. Johnson reportedly believes . .. that the late Presi-
dent made a private commitment to his father [Joseph P. Ken-
nedy] to nominate Morrissey [for the judgeship] after the 1964
election.
The President is said to feel that he should move forward
with the nomination out of respect for his predecessor and as
a special favor to [former] Ambassador Kennedy.
Los Angeles Times, Sept. 30, 1965, at 6, col. 4-5.
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to the idea that the President hoped to embarrass the Kennedys
by the nomination. 40 After all, Johnson was politically astute
enough to know that he himself would not come through un-
blemished, if the nomination was fiercely contested and/or if the
appointment was made, and Morrissey turned out to be a poor
federal judge. By the same token, Edward Kennedy was not
being enticed unknowingly into sponsoring Morrissey; he, too,
was well aware of the pitfalls inherent in the nomination.
The ensuing battle over the nomination demonstrated clearly
that Edward Kennedy wanted the nomination for Morrissey with
all his heart, whatever the reasons. Morrissey had served the
Kennedys, father, John, and Edward, long and well.41 Whether
out of personal gratitude, respect for his father, sincere ad-
miration and respect for Morrissey, or what is more likely, a
combination of all of these elements, Senator Edward Kennedy
fought prodigiously for Judge Morrissey's appointment.
Battle lines were quickly drawn. The ABA Committee and
important elements of the nation's press expressed their opposi-
tion immediately and in no uncertain terms.42 The New York
Herald Tribune called the nomination "nauseous."43 In a highly
unusual step, Judge Wyzanski of the Federal District Court of
Massachusetts-one of the most highly regarded albeit contro-
versial federal judges-wrote to the Senate Judiciary Committee
urging disapproval of the nomination on the grounds that Mor-
rissey "has neither the familiarity with the law nor the industry
to learn it" necessary to be a good federal judge.44 Morrissey
was not without supporters, however. For the edification of the
Senate Judiciary subcommittee which held the hearings on the
nomination, Senator Edward Kennedy was able to produce an
impressive array of supporters, including Speaker of the House
John W. McCormack (D.-Mass.) and the President of the Massa-
40. As Washington Post staffer John P. McKenzie put it:
Political and bar figures familiar with the Morrissey-Ken-
nedy relationship also discounted another theory that has been
prevalent in Washington-that President Johnson sought to
"mousetrap" Edward Kennedy by yielding on an appointment
for which the Senator would be criticized.
Washington Post, Oct. 1, 1965, at All, col. 2.
41. Washington Post, Oct. 3, 1965, at Al, col. 2. See Hearings on
the Nomination of Francis X. Morrissey To Be U.S. District Judge For the
District of Massachusetts Before A Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 15 (1965).
42. Washington Post, Sept. 27, 1965, at 1, col. 3; id., Sept. 29, 1965,
at 1, col. 6.
43. Washington Post, Sept. 29, 1965, at 1, col. 7.
44. Id.
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chusetts Bar Association who testified that his organization en-
dorsed the nomination.45
There apparently were many in and around Boston who
saw the ABA Committee-Wyzanski opposition as simply a kind
of snobbery because of Morrissey's humble beginnings and his
lack of posh educational credentials. 46 In rebuttal, the ABA
Committee rolled out before the subcommittee hearings its three
biggest guns, its last three chairmen, Jenner, Meserve, and Segal.
Their testimony47 hit hard at the chinks in Morrissey's armor.
They pointed out that he had poor legal credentials by contem-
porary standards. He acquired a law degree from a school which
was unaccredited at the time he attended it; in the course of his
work there he had failed four important courses; he had failed
his bar examination twice; and he had acquired very little signifi-
cant legal experience prior to being appointed a municipal judge.
The ABA Committeemen made it abundantly clear that they did
not regard this municipal judgeship as being particularly valu-
able experience for one going on the federal bench.
Despite the lacing Morrissey received at the hands of the
ABA Committee's Big Three, it was not his lack of credentials
or his lack of significant legal experience which finally did him
in. In 1933, for purposes not altogether clear, Judge Morrissey
obtained a law "degree" from a diploma-mill in Georgia and on
the basis of that degree was admitted to the bar of Georgia.48
To gain admission to the bar, Morrissey had claimed that he was
45. Hearings on the Nomination of Francis X. Morrissey, supra
note 41, at 31-38.
46. John P. MacKenzie of the Washington Post captured the flavor
of these feelings when he visited Boston several weeks before the
hearings.
The home of "The Last Hurrah" could not care less what
the American Bar Association thinks of Francis Joseph Xavier
Morrisssey.
To a degree, the same opinion holds for the view of Chief
Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr. that. Morrissey is unqualified to
sit in his Federal District Court.
In fact, if there is any strong feeling around the court-
houses and Democratic parlors, it is one of wry satisfaction that
the organized bar will probably go down swinging this week in
its fight to block Morrissey's Senate confirmation.
The elevation of Morrissey frora the Boston Municipal ...
Court represents to many an "inspiration", a wonderful success
story.
Washington Post, Oct. 3, 1965, at Al, col. 2.
47. Hearings on the Nomination of Francis X. Morrissey, supra
note 41, at 45-98.
48. Id. at 56-66 (teStimony of Albert E. Jenner). For Morrissey's
version of these events, see id. at 98-103.
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a resident of Georgia.49 Mr. Jenner asserted that Morrissey had
remained in Georgia only long enough to gain admission to the
bar and had then returned to Boston.50 Although he never
explicitly said so, Jenner implied that this action reflected on
Morrissey's integrity. Jenner stated to the subcommittee "...
it is this course of events that led us to reach the considered
judgment that Judge Morrissey is not qualified to serve in this
high important office."5' Later in the hearings, Judge Morris-
sey asserted that "I honestly and sincerely thought that I could
practice law and be successful practicing law in the state of
Georgia. 15 2 When Senator Tydings asked Morrissey how long he
had stayed in Georgia, Morrissey replied, "Totally about nine
months. 15 3 When Tydings asked, "How long after you were ad-
mitted to the bar?", Morrissey replied, "I would say about six
months or a little less than six months. '54
The fat was now in the fire. Evidence was brought to light
that Morrissey was a candidate for a seat in the Massachusetts
legislature during the period he claimed to be resident in Geor-
gia. 5  The Justice Department authorized an FBI investigation
"to find out what really happened in Georgia."56 Strangely, the
confirmation now seemed to hinge on what should have been a
peripheral issue.57
Within a matter of several days, Attorney General Katzen-
bach sent a letter to Senator Eastland (D.-Miss.), Chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, stating that the FBI investiga-
tion substantiated Morrissey's version of his Georgia activities.58
Then, with a large number of its members not voting, the Senate
49. Id. at 56-66 (testimony of Albert E. Jenner).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 59.
52. Id. at 101 (testimony of Francis X. Morrissey).
53. Id. at 103.
54. Id.
55. Washington Post, Oct. 16, 1965, at 1, col. 8. See Washington
Post, Oct. 15, 1965, at 1 col. 8.
56. Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D.-Mass.) in Washington Post,
Oct 16, 1965, at 1, col. 8.
57. As the Washington Post observed in its news story:
The issue was not principally whether he utilized a short-
cut "diploma mill" route to win his legal spurs-he never used
the Georgia credentials as a passport to Massachusetts practice.
Rather, it was whether Morrissey, who pleaded loss of memory
on crucial points, had been completely open with the Senators
who had to pass judgment on his qualifications.
Washington Post, Oct. 16, 1965, at A5, col. 1.
58. Graham, F.B.L Report Backs Morrissey's Story of Stay in Geor-
gia, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1965, at 1, coL 3.
1968]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Judiciary Committee voted 6-3 to recommend confirmation.
The Committee action did little to dispel growing Senate un-
easiness over the nomination.0 A story alleging an association
between Morrissey and a deported Mafia figure became the
object of wide speculation. 61 In a dramatic surprise move, Sena-
tor Edward Kennedy rose in the Senate on October 21, 1965, to
ask that the nomination be sent back to the Judiciary Commit-
tee.62 With a voice described as "choked with emotion" and
"near tears,"63 Senator Kennedy lashed out at the critics of the
nomination. He asserted that the F31 had backed Morrissey "on
every controverted point .... No one who knew Frank Morris-
sey could doubt that he was telling the truth."64 He upbraided
the ABA Committee for its posture on Morrissey's qualifications:
The ABA was not satisfied with Judge Morrissey's legal
education and training-perhaps because he attended a local
law school at night, rather than a national law school by day.
I think it is well to point out, however, that good judges
are not to be found only in great law schools. And to restrictjudicial appointments to the graduates of such schools is to
adopt a selection system which is profoundly undemocratic.65
Pulling out all the stops, Senator Kennedy went on:
His father a dockworker, the family living in a home with-
out gas, electricity or heat in the bedrooms; their old shoes
held together with wooden pegs their father made. As the
child of this family, Frank Morrissey could not afford to study
law full time, but had to study at night, . . . snatching what
time he could for his family.66
Senator Mansfield (D.-Mont.), the Senate Majority Leader, rose
to commend Senator Kennedy and to assert that there were
59.
For Confirmation Against Confirmation Not Voting
Eastland Dirkson McClellan
Burdick Ervin Long (D.-Mo.)
Dodd Scott Bayh
Hart Tydings
Kennedy, E. Hruska
Smathers Fong
Javits (Absent; said
he would have
voted against)
CONGRSSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAc 1432 (1965).
60. Wicker, The Morrissey Affair, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1965, at 26,
col. 1.
61. Id.
62. 111 CoNG. Ec. 27,935-36 (1965).
63. Boston Herald, Oct. 22, 1965, at 1, col. 3; Washington Post,
Oct. 22, 1965, at 1, col. 8.
64. 111 CONG. REc. 27,935-36 (1965).
65. Id.
66. Id.
[Vol. 52:965
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS-1963-1966
votes enough to confirm the nomination.6 7 In any case, it is not
clear that Senator Kennedy was actually giving up the ghost.
He asked only that the nomination be recommitted to the Ju-
diciary Committee. Presumably, the action to recommit would
allow time to air the FBI report and to refute or explain the
allegation of association with an underworld character and still
leave the way open for confirmation. 8 The President had re-
assured Senator Kennedy before the dramatic Senate action that
he himself was very much behind Morrissey's nomination or he
would not have submitted it, but that it was a Senate matter, and
he would abide by the Senator's judgment. 69 Judge Morrissey,
however, had had enough. Within a fortnight, he wrote to the
President and asked that his name be removed from further con-
sideration.70 The President lauded him for his courage and
agreed to comply with his wishes in the matter.71
Whatever the merits (or lack of them) of attempting to put
Judge Morrissey on the federal bench, the carnage of the battle
was monumental. John P. MacKenzie assessed the damage ac-
curately in a perceptive post-battle account in the Washington
Post:
Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D.-Mass.), Morrissey's spon-
sor, suffered a variety of injuries. Only by dropping the fight
in the showdown Senate session Thursday did he cut his losses
in strained relationships and political I.O.U.'s. His allies were
grateful and they warmed to his emotional withdrawal speech,
but their gratitude was of the it-feels-so-good-when-the-beat-
ing-stops variety.
Only the Senator's reputation for political loyalty was en-
hanced. The affair did nothing to boost his influence at the
White House, for he risked injuring President Johnson. His
ability to concede defeat showed a new phase of his political
maturity, but he did lose.... His standing in Boston may
actually have improved, but in the last analysis he did dump
Morrissey.
Sen. Robert S. [sic] Kennedy (D.-N.Y.), who dispensed
more Federal judicial appointments than any Attorney Gen-
eral in history, did no good for his own legal reputation by
trying to rescue a nomination he never consummated while
at the Justice Department.
President Johnson who nominated Morrissey after John F.
Kennedy could not or would not bring himself to do it, was
injured in a vital area-pride in the quality of executive ap-
pointments....
67. Id. Senator Dirkson later claimed that this was not so. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 22, 1965, at 1, col. 8.
68. 111 CONG. REc. 27,935-36 (1965).
69. Boston Herald, Oct. 22, 1965, at 5, col. 1.
70. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1965, at 1, col. 8.
71. Id.
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The American Bar Association is not unscathed in victory.
Handicapped by its own mechanical standards for qualifications,
the ABA failed to persuade politicians at the nominating and
early confirmation stages. It blocked confirmation only by
taking off the gloves with the Kennedys, by dredging records
and by testimony off limits in paneled law office waiting
rooms.
The ABA entered the thicket without hope of victory but
with determination to frame an issue for future appointments to
the Federal bench. It ended up playing a fierce political game
and the victory may have been costly in terms of the prestige
and disinterestedness of its judgment on nominees....
In the Senate itself, only the unanimously opposed Republi-
cans and their leader Everett M. Dirkson of Illinois, seem to
have emerged free of scratches.
But Senate Democrats will be licking their wounds for a
long time. The nomination was exposed to public view just
long enough so that Senators could not avoid looking at it.
Some of them were revolted, and others who have made lofty
statements on the need for a strong judiciary were in an em-
barrassing predicament.
Perhaps the biggest loser in the whole affair is Attorney
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, whose summary of the
last-minute FBI check into the .Georgia incident carried so
little weight on Capitol Hill. Instead of rehabilitating the
nominee and the defunct Athens, Ga. "law school" Morrissey
attended, Katzenbach's action brought the charges that the
FBI had been politically invoked.
Katzenbach, who only a year ago was Bobby Kennedy's
indispensible deputy at Justice, found his name used in ardent
support of the nomination. In vouching stoutly for the credi-
bility of the nominee, Katzenbach l.eft a cloud over the investi-
gative process that screens nominees for high office.7
2
IV. JOHNSON'S 1966 NOMINATIONS
Despite its posture that it was not much impressed with
ABA ratings, and its posture with :respect to the climactic meet-
ing of the President and the ABA Committee in May of 1966,73
the Administration apparently was concerned about the need to
make appointments which would deserve high ratings from the
Committee. Understandably stung by the criticism which had
been heaped upon it as a result of the Coleman and Morrissey
nominations, the Administration had good reason to seek to re-
gain the confidence of the press and public, if not the Committee.
In any case, for whatever reasons, the nominations in 1966
72. Washington Post, Oct. 25, 1965, at A3, col. 1.
73. Some sort of rift had obviously developed between the Admin-
istration and the ABA Committee over the Morrissey nomination. The
Committee met with the President, but no official announcement of any
new understanding was made. Washington Post, May 19, 1966, at A6,
col. 5-7.
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through May were excellent by ABA Committee standards. Of
12 nominations, 2 (16.7%) were rated exceptionally well quali-
fied, 6 (50%) well qualified, 4 (33.3%) qualified and none un-
qualified. For all of 1966, the score for 63 nominations was:
Exceptionally Well Qualified 9 (14.3%)
Well Qualified 30 (47.6%)
Qualified 23 (36.5%)
Not Qualified 0
No Rating Given 1 (1.6%)
The chart following on the next several pages is a tabulation of
some significant data on the Johnson nominees of 1966.
The ratings of the Johnson nominations in 1966 made the
overall Johnson record with the ABA through 1966 compare
more favorably with the records of his immediate predecessors on
both the high and low points of the scale:
Johnson Johnson
1st Overall
Eisenhower Kennedy Year through 1966
Exceptionally Well
Qualified 17.1% 16.6% 5.6% 11.5%
Well Qualified 44.6 45.6 22.2 41.6
Qualified 32.6 31.5 55.5 42.4
Not Qualified 5.7 6.3 16.7 4.5
On other significant characteristics, the Johnson appoint-
ments were not markedly different from those of his immediate
predecessors.
Number of Number Who
Appeals Court Had Been Federal
Appointments District Judges
Eisenhower 45 17 38%
Kennedy 21 8 38
Johnson 28 14 50
(through 1966)
Number of Number with
Appeals Court Judicial Experience
Appointments at Fed. or St. Level
Eisenhower 45 28 62%
Kennedy 21 11 52
Johnson 28 16 57
(through 1966)
It is significant that three of the appeals courts appointees who
did not have previous judicial experience were men of consider-
able stature. The controversial James P. Coleman, after all, had
been the Governor of Mississippi (rated WQ by the ABA Commit-
tee). Anthony J. Celebrezze had been Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare (rated Q), and Frank M. Coffin at forty-
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six had been a well-regarded Congressman and a high-ranking
U.S. Foreign Aid official (rated EWQ).
Thirty-four per cent of Johnson's district court appointees
had previous judicial experience as against 26 per cent of Eisen-
hower's and 33 per cent of Kennedy's. The Johnson judges in-
cluded only 5 per cent from the opposing party as compared to
5 per cent for Eisenhower and 8 per cent for Kennedy. The
Johnson Administration showed a small margin of overall par-
tiality for younger appointees than its predecessors:
District Judges Circuit Court Judges
60 and 60 and
over 50-59 40-49 35-39 over 50-59 40-49 30-39
Eisenhower 10% 56% 31% 3% 10% 64% 22% 4%
Kennedy 8 54 34 4 8 62 30
Johnson
(through 1966) 11 44 44 1 7 61 29 3
District Judges Circuit Court Judges
Mean Average Mean Average
Eisenhower 53 51 54 53
Kennedy 52 52 53 52
Johnson 51 51 52 52
(through 1966)
A larger percentage of the Johnson appointees identified
themselves as Catholics or Jews than did the Eisenhower and
Kennedy appointees:
Catholics Jews
Eisenhower 13% 7%
Kennedy 15 8
Johnson (through 1966) 23 8
The Johnson Administration also showed some partiality to-
ward graduates of Ivy League Law Schools:
Percentage of Appointees Who Attended Ivy League Law Schools
District Judges Appeals Court Judges
Eisenhower 21% 29%
Kennedy 18 19
Johnson (through 1966) 24 32
Twelve per cent of the Johnson appointments were made
from the ranks of U.S. Attorneys as compared to 7 per cent in the
Eisenhower Administration and less than 3 per cent in the Ken-
nedy Administration.
For whatever it is worth, which admittedly may not be very
much, another piece of interesting data is offered.
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Percentage of Appointments in Who's Who the Year
Before Appointment
Eisenhower 35%
Kennedy 27
Johnson (through 1966) 45
V. THE LBJ BRAND ON JUDICIAL SELECTION
Understandably, at the beginning of his term, President John-
son was too preoccupied with other matters to give much atten-
tion to judicial selection. The team at the Department of Justice
remained the same, and they continued to conduct their judicial
selection business as they had done while President Kennedy was
alive. There were, however, some signs of restiveness on the
part of the White House Staff. Joseph Dolan 74 was asked to
meet with White House staffers Walter Jenkins, Ralph Dungan,
and Jack Valenti. Dolan outlined the procedures in use for the
selection of nominees to the bench, and it was agreed that busi-
ness should go on as usual. At that time Walter Jenkins, the
President's key aid, assured me as he had Dolan that no changes
in procedure were contemplated. There seemed to me, nonethe-
less, a greater effort on the part of Dolan to keep White House
staffers informed in an informal way of significant developments
leading up to the Departmental recommendations of nominees.
It is significant, too, that of the three White House Staffers
with whom Dolan dealt, only Dungan was a carry-over from the
Kennedy Administration. Jenkins and Valenti were brought to
the White House by Johnson.
It was not long before President Johnson began to put his
individual mark on the appointment process. Robert Kennedy
resigned from his post as Attorney General in early September
of 1964 to embark on his quest for a seat in the Senate.7 5 Joseph
Dolan followed soon after to become the victorious Robert Ken-
nedy's Administrative Assistant.7 6 In the meantime, John Macy,
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission was brought over to
the White House to serve also as a personnel advisor to the Presi-
dent. His role was "to pull all appointment matters together."77
At first, Dungan continued to function with respect to non-
judicial appointments, but he was destined to leave soon to be-
74. Dolan was the Deputy Assistant Attorney General who had the
responsibility of investigating potential judicial appointees.
75. N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1964, at 1, col. 2.
76. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1964, at 25, col. 7.
77. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1965, at 21, col. 1 (Macy's account).
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come ambassador to Chile.78
Giving a White House staffer, John Macy, a role in judicial
selection was a marked departure from the method of opera-
tion which prevailed during the Kennedy Administration, when
the White House staff members were reluctant to insert them-
selves between the brothers Kennedy. Needless to say, cir-
cumstances had changed markedly. From the time of Robert
Kennedy's resignation in September 1964 to the middle of Feb-
ruary 1965, Nicholas Katzenbach was Acting Attorney General.
Katzenbach was closely identified as a Robert Kennedy man.
Political alignments and enmities being what they were, there
was good reason for the President to desire to protect his own
political interests by having a member of his staff active in
judicial selection. A case can, of course, also be made for the
logic and wisdom of having one man in the White House Office
review all high-level appointments, since some who have been
considered for federal judgeships might also be fit for other im-
portant posts and vice versa. At any rate this was the Presi-
dent's reason, in Macy's view, for giving him this role. Presi-
dent Johnson's special feelings for John Macy began when John-
son, as Vice President, was serving as chairman of the Commit-
tee on Equal Opportunity in Federal Hiring. Macy gave him a
great deal of help at a time when Johnson felt slighted by other
members of the Kennedy Administration.79 In any event, for
whatever reasons, John Macy was given a role to play in judicial
selection, and he has continued to play that role to this day.
After patently lengthy deliberation, the President appointed
Katzenbach as the Attorney General. Three things were note-
worthy about the appointment. First, was the time it took
to make it. Second, was the President's announcement of it.80
Third, was his appointment, at the same time he appointed
Katzenbach Attorney General, of Ramsey Clark, about whose
78. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1965, at 10, coL 1.
79. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1965, at 21, col. 3.
80. Mr. Johnson said he ... called Mr. Katzenbach in and
asked him what he would like to do with his future. The
President revealed that he had asked Mrn. Katzenbach if he
would like a "high.judicial appointment" or another importantjob in the Government, outside the Cabinet. He said that Mr.
Katzenbach had indicated a desire to stay in the executive
branch.
The President, without saying so flatly, left'the impression
that he had only been testing Mr. Katzenbach. He said that a
few days later he told him he would like him to be the Presi-
dent's lawyer.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 14,-1965, at 1,-col. 5.
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political loyalties he could be surer, as the Deputy Attorney
General.
According to Macy, the bulk of the work and negotiation
with Senators is still done at the Justice Department. Macy
works with them on an informal and telephonic basis. As Jus-
tice formulates a choice, Macy checks it out, both on the basis of
objective credentials and through his own network of contacts.
Macy's office has developed a host of confidential and respected
contacts throughout the country. In considering a nomination,
Macy's office, as a matter of routine, checks out the candidates
with its own sources. These are people whom Macy, in a long
and distinguished government career, has come to know per-
sonally and whose judgments as to personnel he has come to
trust. The President himself takes an unusual personal as well
as official interest in every high-level appointment. A former
staffer attributes the President's personal interest to three fact-
ors. First, the President by nature is people-oriented, i.e., he
thinks in terms of people rather than in terms of things. He has
an inordinate range of acquaintanceships, and he knows per-
sonally or knows about a larger percentage of the people consid-
ered for high office than any previous president. Second, be-
cause of his humble origins, the President, more than most
presidents, has a feeling that high posts in government, aside
from their importance, are exceptionally good jobs and, there-
fore, should go to only the most deserving and meritorious con-
tenders. Because of his interest in people and his view that
these high posts are choice prizes, he is personally curious as to
who is being considered. Third, the President's penchant and
zeal for consulting with everyone who might be able to add some-
thing to a presidential decision or who should be consulted for
one reason or another means that the President frequently re-
quests that Macy consult with named individuals.
Since checking and consulting with people tends to create
reciprocal expectations, it is not surprising that Macy's office
receives a great deal of gratuitous advice from the people he
consults about people who should be considered when a vacancy
occurs. Such suggestions are passed on to Justice for investi-
gation.
In contrast to his recent predecessors,"' President Johnson
has indicated to his team that he wants greater deference to
senatorial prerogative in judicial selection. Whereas Joseph
81. Chase, Federal Judges: The Appointing Process, 51 MNN. L.
REv. 185, 210-18 (1966).
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Dolan in the Kennedy Administration and William Rogers in the
Eisenhower Administration sought "to take as much ground" as
they could for the President in jockeying with Senators over
judicial selection, Ernest C. Friesen, who replaced Dolan, ex-
plained that his orders were to go along with the Senators of the
President's party unless the Senators urged unacceptable ap-
pointments. It is not difficult to reconstruct reasons for Presi-
dent Johnson's predilection for deference to Senators. Johnson,
both as a Senator and as Senate Majority Leader insisted on his
senatorial prerogatives because he believed in them. Further,
perhaps, more than any other president in our history, he is
closely attuned to the political process in which senatorial pre-
rogative plays a crucial part. This deference manifests itself in
one very significant way. President Johnson has been most reluc-
tant to use the recess appointment as a means of forcing Adminis-
tration choices for judgeships on reluctant Senators.8 2 Whereas
14 per cent of Eisenhower's appointments were first recess ap-
pointments and 22 per cent of Kennedy's appointments were first
recess appointments, not one of the purely Johnson appointments
in his first two years of office were recess appointments. When
the Senate did not act on three appointments in 1965, LBJ waited
until the next year to offer their names to the Senate again rather
than make recess appointments. Surprisingly, whereas Presidents
Eisenhower and Kennedy employed delay as a tactic for pressing
for their Administration choices by taking seven months or
longer to fill a vacancy in 26 per cent and 18 per cent of the
nominations respectively, of the first 81 appointments in the
Johnson Administration 26 or 32 per cent were appointments to
vacancies which had been open for seven months or more. This
can be partly explained by the fact that it took the "new" team
a while to get its bearings. While the incidence of delayed ap-
pointments has diminished the longer the Johnson Administra-
tion has been in power, it has not done so significantly when
compared with the Eisenhower and. Kennedy Administrations.
VI. CONCLUSIONS-THE HYPOTHESIS SUGGESTED BY
THE DATA
What emerges from this account of the Johnson Administra-
tion's selection of federal judges and the comparisons of the
characteristics of its selections with those of the Eisenhower
and Kennedy Administrations suggests that the dynamics of
82. Id. at 217.
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judicial selection are such that administrations which are bas-
ically concerned with making appointments of high quality, will
choose the same kinds of people for the same kinds of reasons
whatever goals and standards they articulate and whatever pro-
cedures they employ.

